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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE LEININGER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
STEARNS-ROGER 1\IANUF AC-
TURING COMPANY, a corpora-
tion; XYZ CO~IPANY, a corpora-
tion; X, Y and Z, a co-partnership, 
DOES I through \r, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case 
No.10193 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is replete with ex-
traneous facts 'vhich tend to confuse the real legal rela-
tionship that existed bet,veen the parties to this action. 
His statement glosses over the admitted undisputed facts 
that were the basis for the District Court's Order for 
Summary Judgment. The uncontroverted facts that Ap-
pellee bases its position are as follows : 
In 1957, Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company 
completed its job at Mexican Hat, Utah, as the general 
1 
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contractor for the construction of the uranium reduction 
mill for the App·ellant's employer, Texas-Zinc Minerals 
Corporation. The contract for the construction of the 
mill is in evidence (Plf. Ex 1) which delineates the rela-
tionship between Stearns-Roger and Texas-Zinc. The 
contract contemplates that the Contractee will, in some 
instances, specify certain items of equipment. Article 
four ( 4) states as follows : 
ARTICLE 4. CoNTRACTOR's DuTIES AND RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES: This Contractor shall be responsible for the 
execution and completion of the work in accord-
ance with the provisions of this contract. The 
Contractor undertakes to turn over to the 
Company a completed uranium ore processing 
plant and copper concentrating plant, including 
appurtenances thereto and the said additional sur-
face facilities, ready for operation in a manner 
satisfactory to the Company; provided, however, 
that the Contractor shall have no responsibility 
for the a,dequacy of certa.in major items of equip-
ment selected solely by the Compa.ny where the 
sa.me are prop·erly installed and functioning in 
a.ccorda;n.ce with the manufacturers' representa-
tions. (Emphasis supplied) 
Appellant alleges that the accident in controversy 
occurred on September 12, 1960, almost three ( 3) years 
after Appellee had completed his job and almost four (4) 
years after the fans in question 'vere made operable in 
the assay lab. The Appellant, in the course of his em-
ployment with Texas-Zinc, 'Yas injured in the disman-
tling of a. Duriron Fan. 
The fans in controversy 'vere selected by the Con-
tractee, Texas-Zinc's chemist, Robert Louis 1\tiaurice, Jr. 
2 
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The uncontroverted fa.c.ts sho·w· that Mr. ~1aurice was 
on the job site prior to the completion of the construction 
and instructed Appellee to procure the particular fans. 
Mr. ~fa.urice testified during his deposition (Depo. of 
Robert Lewis Maurice, Jr., pp. 2, 3 and 4), as follows: 
Q. And what is your occupation~ 
A. Chief Chemist. 
Q. Forwhom~ 
A. Texas-Zinc ~iinerals Corporation. 
Q. And is that at ~iexican Hat, Utah~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how long have you been engaged in that 
occupation~ 
A. Sinee the first of September, 1956. 
Q. Now I understand you are a graduate chemist, 
is that right~ 
A. I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in 
chemistry. 
Q. And 'vhat did you tell me that your position is 
with Texa.s-Zinc ~ 
A. Chief Chemist. 
Q. And how long have you had that position~ 
A. Well, ever since September the 1st, 1956. I 
would have to count it and see, little over five 
years. 
Q. Were you here at the time of the construction 
of the plant~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And during the construction of the plan yon 
observed, of course, the construction and the 
3 
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facilities which 'vere · placed in the chemical 
laboratory building, didn't you¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did you have anything to do 'vith the de-
termination or selection of any of the mate-
rials that were installed within the plant -
within the chemical laboratory¥ 
A. Within the chem lab, yes. 
Q. To what extent would that amount to~ 
A. Practically all of it. 
Q. Did you have anything to do with these ex-
haust fans? 
A.. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And what was that, Mr. Maurice¥ 
A. Well, I guess the best way to put it is that 
I :gave specifications which were to - for 
these fans, what they were supposed to do. 
Q. Can you tell generally what those specifica-
tions were~ 
A. Well, the specifications were at the time that I 
gave the specifications - actually I sent 
Stearns-Roger to Lucius Pitkin A. E. C. lab-
oratory in Grand Junction and told them that 
I wanted the same installation that they had 
there. 
Q. Did yon know the nature of the exhaust fans 
they had at Lucius Pitkin f 
A. I knew that they were the Duriron Fans. 
Subsequent to the deposition of !Ir. Maurice, on the 
18th day of ~lay, 1962, Requests for Admission of Facts 
were framed and submitted to the Appellant, on October 
4 
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15, 1962 (R. 26 and 27). The initial question presented 
was: 
Does plaintiff admit that the Duriron Exhaust 
Fans referred to in Plaintiff's Complaint were se-
lected by Mr. Robert Maurice, ''Chief Chemist'' 
of the Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation~ 
Appellant answered on the 9th day of November, 
1962, by denying said request. On the 22nd day of April, 
1964, Appellee submitted the follo,ving Interrogatory to 
Plaintiff, Archie Leininger (R. 98): 
1. In defendant's Request for Admission of 
Facts served on plaintiff, prior to this date, the 
plaintiff denied that the Duriron Exhaust Fans re-
ferred to in Plaintiff's Complaint were selected by 
l\tlr. Robert Maurice, Chief Chemist of the Texas-
Zinc Mineral Corporation. In light of said an-
swer, state all fact or facts, concerning the selec-
tion of the Duriron Exhaust Fans. In connec-
tion 'vith this Interrogatory, but not limiting your-
self, state who selected said fans, the date that 
said fans were selected and any and all facts that 
you have at your disposal that neg·a.tes the tes-
timony of Robert Lewis Maurice, as testified by 
him on pages three and four of his disposition tak-
en on the 18th day of ~lay, 1962. 
Appellant ans,vered said Interrogatory by admitting 
the fact that lVlr. Maurice selected said fans on the 1st day 
of May, 1964 (R. 104). The deposition of Mr. ~iauric0 
showed that he had experience 'vith Duriron Fans prior 
to the time that he made his selection and that he made 
his choice based upon his past experience in working in 
assay labs. 
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In the Appellant's Statement of Facts much time 
is presented showing that this particular type of fan of 
Duriron 's "\Vas involved in many explosions. There is not 
one scintilla of evidence, however, that any explosion 
occurred involving these particular fans prior to the date 
that Mr. Maurice designated the fan in question. All 
explosions occurred subsequent to this date; and Appel-
lant's evidence, therefore, shows that this type of fan 
was generally considered safe and proper by the industry 
and, further, was widely used in the industry. 
It is admitted that after the fans were selected by 
Mr. Maurice, they 'vere received from the manufacturer 
fully assembled (Plaintiff's answer to Interrogatory No. 
2, R. 104-105). Therefore, the only act performed by 
Stearns-Roger in the "installation" was to place these 
fans, "\vhich were fully assembled, in the space allocated 
for them in the laboratory. 
Plaintiff's theory concerning the accident in ques-
tion was that the sealing compound contained a certain 
chemical mixture that caused the fans to explode when 
the Appellant was disassembling the same during the 
course of maintenance of said fans. The evidence shows 
that Appellee, Stearns-Roger, had no knowledge of the 
propensity of these particular fans to explode and had 
reeeived no information of the same until after the com-
mencement of this la'v suit (R. 112). However, Texas-
Zinc was 'vell aware of this propensity (Depo. of Robert 
Lewis Maurice, pp. 7 and 8). Notwithstanding this 
knowledge, Texas-Zinc instructed and directed the plain-
6 
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tiff to dismantle this fan. Though plaintiff denies that 
he was 'varned of any particular problem, there is no 
doubt that Texas-Zinc "\vas cognizant of the fact that 
these fans had exploded in the past. 
ARGU~1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED 
THAT THE DEFENDANT CONTRACTOR 
WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE WORK AFTER 
COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE BY 
TEXAS-ZINC .. 
There is much confusion in judicial decision on 
whether or not a contractor is insulated from liability 
for his negligence to a third person after acceptance of 
the job by the contractee. These diverse opinions are set 
forth in 58 ALR 2d, p. 847. 
It is Appellee's position, that the la'v in the State 
of Utah, is settled by the companion cases of Berg v. Otis 
Elevator Comparn.y, 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832, and Sut-
ton v. Otis Elevator Company, 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437. 
Some jurisdictions, as Appellant has pointed out, ha.Yc 
extended the MacPherson doctrine to building contrac-
tors and there has been many decisions criticizing the 
insulation theory as being antiquated and outmoded. 
The Berg and Sutton cases, supra, that appellant is ask-
ing this Court to overturn, however, do not hold for this 
so-called outmoded doctrine. The Berg and Sutton cases 
state that a contractor may be liable to third persons if 
certain conditions are met. It should be pointed out, 
7 
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therefore, that 've need not make an ''Assault Upon the 
Citadel" in disposing of this matter. 
The fact situation in this case is radically different 
that the ''normal'' contractor-contractee-third person re-
lationship. The Duriron Fan which exploded was not 
selected by the Contractor. The choice of this fan was 
the Contractee 's. Appellant has cited no case, nor can 
any be found, that would place a duty on a contractor of 
examining the contractee 's choice of equipment and ar-
bitrarily rejecting the same. The Appellant's position is 
one of asserting a duty on the contractor, after being in-
structed by the contractee to furnish a particular item of 
equipment from a reputable manufacturer, to tear down 
and completely disassemble the item of equipment; and 
the further duty of running a chemical test of the in-
gredients of a cement-like sealing compound. 
As stated above, the Berg and Sutton cases do not 
hold that a contractor is completely immune from liabil-
ity after the acceptance of the job by the contractee. 
These cases state that under certain circumstances the 
contractor may be held liable for injuries to third per-
sons. The Berg and Sutton cases recognizes, however, 
the basic distinction between a contractor and a manu-
facturer of chattels. This distinction is pointed out in 
13 ALR 2d p. 196 : 
Thus, a manufacturer or processor of articles 
in manufacturing or processing the same does not 
ordinarily act as a contractor with the interme-
diate dealer, and the articles are not usually pre-
pared according to specifications prescribed by 
the intermediate dealer, \vhereas a building or 
8 
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construction contractor frequently undertakes to 
construct the thing contracted for with the con-
tractee according to the latter's specifications. In 
such case the contractee knows, or is presumed to 
lmow, that the structure contracted for is likely 
to result in injury or damage to third persons, and 
the contractor may not ordinarily be expected to 
question the safety and soundness of his con-
tractee 's specifications or plans for the work. 
There is, therefore, found in the relation of the 
contractor and the contractee elements laeking in 
the relation of a manufacturer and intermediate 
dealer ·w·hich 'vould "~arrant the application of the 
doctrine of proximate cause in such a way as to 
connect the injury more closely to the negligence 
of the contractee in exposing third persons to the 
danger of faulty specifications and separate it 
from the contractor's original negligence in con-
structing the dangerous structure. This differ-
ence is in some cases recognized in judicial opin-
ions (see Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (1919) 
188 Ind. 79, 122 NE 1) .... 
The Berg and Sutton cases hold that in order to hold 
the contractor liable, the plaintiff must affirmatively 
prove- three (3) elements. First, the plaintiff must show 
that the contractor had reason to kno·w· about the danger-
ously instrumentality. Secondly, that the contractee 
could not, and did not, discover the defect. Thirdly, it 
must be proved that the contractor had knowledge of the 
dangerous condition. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT PRO PERL ·~f RUIJED 
THAT DEFENDANT STEARNS WAS NOT 
LIABI_JE BECAUSE THE FAN WAS SELECT-
9 
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ED BY AND FURNISHED AT THE REQUEST 
OF TEXAS-ZINC, PLAINTIFF'S El\1PLOYER. 
The defendant Stearns-Roger relied at the pre-trial, 
when the 1fotion for Summary Judgment was heard, and 
now heavily relies upon the uncontroverted facts that 
Contractee-Owner requested the Dnriron Fan and that 
the same was delivered fully assembled. The only way 
that Stearns could have discovered the defect 'vas to dis-
assemble the fan, ''despite the fact that litharge and 
glycerine hardened to a cement-like compound upon set-
ting" (Appellant's Statement of Facts, p. 8), and run a 
chemical analysis of the sealing compound. For the pur-
pose of Stearn's Motion for Summary Judgment, it was 
admitted that a chemical mixture existed in the sealing 
compound, which, after the accumulation of time, would 
be unsafe. There 'vas no practical "\vay, ho,vever, for 
Stearns to have discovered this fact. 
Even in those jurisdictions which haYe adopted the 
so-called ''modern view'' as to the responsibility of con-
tractors to third persons, there is a unanimity of deci-
sions holding that a building contractor is not liable if 
he follows the plans and specifications furnished him by 
the owner-contractee. 13 Ani Jur. 2d, Section 140, page 
131, states : 
Section 140. Rule of liability 'vhere negligent 
'vork reasonably certain to endanger third persons. 
In a number of recent cases, the courts have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the process 
of beginning 'vith the above rule of nonliability 
and then follo,Ying it through the emasculating 
exceptions to the rule, and have favored a 
10 
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more direct approach. Instead of applying the 
rule of nonliability and its exceptions, these 
courts have established the rule that a build-
ing or construction contractor is liable for injur-
ies to or the death of third persons, occurring 
after the acceptance of the completed 'vork by the 
contractee, \vhere the \vork is reasonably certain 
to endanger third persons if negligently prepared 
or constructed. This vie'v is based on recognition 
of the fact that there are no sufficient grounds for 
a differentiation between the liability for negli-
gence of a. manufacturer of goods and that of a 
building or construction contractor, and the deci-
sions supporting this Yiew are, in fact or effect, 
an application of the rule governing the liability 
of manufacturers to ultimate consumers for defec-
tive products. The liability of a buildi1z,g contrac-
tor under this rule is not absolttle, howecer, but is 
predicated on negligence, and thus a contractor 
follotvin,g pla.ns and specifications given to him, 
and which a reasonable man tvould follou~, is not 
liable for injuries resulting from the structure. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
This Yiew is also sustained in 58 .A.LR2d 891-898 which 
plaintiff cites as the annotation supporting his position, 
at page 893, Section 53 (d) the editor speaks as follo,vs: 
(d) Effect of rule. 
The adaption of the modern view in eases in-
volving building or construction contractors has 
the effect of applying to them the ].1ae-Pherson 
rule. It does not have the effect of making the 
contractor absolutely liable to third persons 'vith-
out negligence. 
Thus, it \vas stated in Russell Y. Arthur 'Vhit-
comb, Inc. (1956) 100 NH 171, 121 A2d 781, that 
one important limitation on the rule placing build-
11 
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ing contractors on the same footing as sellers of 
goods, and holding them to the general standard 
of reasonable care for the protection of anyonf 
"~ho may foreseeably be endangered by their neg-
ligence even after acceptance of the work, is that 
the contractor is not liable if he has merely carried 
out the plans, specifications, and directions given 
him, since in that ca.se the responsibility is as-
sumed by the employer, at least when the plans 
are not so obviously dangerous that no reason-
able man would follo'v them. 
For an application of this principle, see Per-
son v. Cauld,vell-Wingale Co. (1951. CA2d NY) 
187 F2d 832, cert den 341 US 936, 95 L ed 1364, 71 
S Ct 855, infra, & 61. 
Prosser on Torts (2d Edition), Section 85, p. 519 states: 
It appears, however, that the analogy of l\Iac-
Pherson Y. Buick l\1otor Co., is at last being ac-
cepted. Several recent decisions have placed 
building contractors on the same footing as sell-
ers of goods, and have held them to the general 
standard of reasonable care for the protection of 
anyone who may foreseeably be endangered by the 
negligence, even after acceptanee of the work. One 
important limitation recognized in several cases 
is that the contractor is not liable if he has merely 
carried out carefully the plans, specifications and 
directions given him, since in that case the re-
sponsibility is assumed by the employer, at least 
where the plans are not so obviously dangerous 
that no reasonable man 'vould follo·w· them. 
The follo""ing cases sustain the proposition that a 
contractor is not liable if he follo"~s plans and specifiea-
tions, and subsequent}~~ it appears that said plans and 
specifications ma)r ha Ye been defective. 
12 
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John.son. v. City of San. Learndro, 179 Cal Ap·p2d 794, 
4 Cal Rptr 404 (1960); Loesch v R. P. Farn.sworth & Co.,. 
12So2d 222, (La App 1943); Romwno v RossOIYto Const. 
Co., 341 Mass 718, 171 NE2d 853 (1961); Trustees of the 
First Baptist Church v McElroy, 223 Miss 327, 78 So2d 
138 (1955); Lydecker v Board of Chosen Freeholders, 91 
NJL. 622, 103 A 251 (1918); Tiplon v Clower, 67 NM 388, 
356 P2d 46 (1960); Rubin v Girard Trust Co., 154 Pa 
Super 257, 35 A2d 601 (1944); Belk v J. A. Const. Co., 
272 F2d 394 (6th Cir (Tenn) 1959); Thornton v Dow, 60 
Wash 622, 111 P 899 (1910); Inma;n v Bin,ghamto~~ Hous-
ing Authority, 1 AD2d 599, 152 NYS 2d 79 (1956), rev'd 
on other grounds, 3 NY2d 137, 164 NYS2d 699, 143 NE2d 
895, (1957), 59 ALR2d 1072 (1958); Ryan v Feeney & 8. 
Bldg. Co., 239 NY 43, 145 NE 321 41 ALR 1; Russel v Ar-
thur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 NH 171, 121 A2d 781. 
Stearns admits Appellant's statement that "it did 
not perform any other test ... " {Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, p. 6) and therefore, the issue presented is what 
duty did Searns have in pe-rforming tests that would 
have detected the alleged defect. Appellant cites no au-
thority that requires Stearns to make tests but rather 
cites the analogy of the duties of a ''Supplier of Chat-
tels" by citing Section 402 of the Restatement of Tort~. 
Stearns can not be considered a supplier of chattel~. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note what the Restate-
ment feels is the duty of a supplier to test. Section 402 
originally read as follows : 
§ 402 Duty to Inspect Chattel. 
A vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third 
13 
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person is subject to liability as stated in § 399, if, 
although he is ignorant of the dangerous character 
or condition of the chattel, he could have discov-
ered it by exercising reasonable care to utilize the 
peculiar opportunity and competence which as a 
dealer in such chattels he has or should have. 
If one was to assume that we were in the position of 
a ''Supplier of Chattels,'' then perhaps we may be under 
an obligation to test the fan based on the above rule in 
that the phrase ''Could Have Discovered It'' might giYe 
this connotation. 
Because of this problem Section 402 'vas revised in 
the 1948 Supplement and states as follows: 
§ 402. DuTY To INSPECT CHATTEL. 
ABSENCE OF DuTY TO INSPECT CHATTEL. A 
vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third per-
son, who neither knows nor has reason to know 
that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not sub-
ject to liability for harm caused by the dangerous 
character or condition of the chattel even though 
he could have discoYered it by an inspection or 
test of the chattel before selling it. 
The editor makes some germane points on the need 
for the revision 'vhich clearly shows the Plaintiff's un-
realistic position in this ease at page 716 as follow'"S: 
Comment: 
a. For the meaning of ''reason to kno"~'' see 
§§ 12(1) and 401, Comment a. The dangerous 
character or condition of the chattel, in the cir-
cumstances stated in this section, is not a fact 
which the vendor ''should kno"'T'' as those 'vords 
are defined in § 12(2). 
14 
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b. There is a clear distinction between the lia-
bility of a manufacturer and that of a vendor for 
harm caused by a chattel made by the former and 
sold by the latter. The manufacturer of a danger-
ously defective chattel is the ereator of something 
which is foreseeably dangerous when it is used for 
the purpose for which it is manufactured. The 
constructing of the chattel defectively, "\vith 
knowledge it is to be sent out to be used, is an 
unreasonably dangerous activity. On the other 
hand, the vendor who reasonably believes that the 
chattel he is selling is safe for use is not, in sell-
ing and delivering the chattel, doing anything 
'vhich is foreseea bly likely to cause harm. The 
slight risk inherent in the possibility the chattel 
may be defective is not sufficient to constitute an 
unreasonable risk. The burden on the vendor of 
requiring him to inspeet chattels he reasonably be-
lieves to be free from hidden danger outweighs 
the magnitude of the risk that a particular chattel 
may be dangerously defective (See ~~ 291-293}. 
Negligence is determined in the light of the facts 
known to the actor (See~ 282, Comment g). 
The editor goes on to state the reason for the change 
was occasioned by semantical confusion and states at 
page 718 the following: 
... At the time these Sections were originally 
drafted, no decision of any Court of last resort in 
England or America had ever held that a vendor 
had a duty to inspect chattels before selling them. 
The only decision by an intermediate court "\VaH 
Garvey v. Namm, 2d Dept. 1910, 121 N1TS 422 
136 App. Div. 815. In that case, a divided court 
held that the plaintiff, who had purchased a r>9c 
wrapper at a department store sale, and "\Vho ,vas 
scratched by a basting needle left in an unfinishe<l 
seam, could recover from a vendor for harm re-
15 
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ceived "'"hen scratched by the needle. That de-
cision seems to be ridiculous on its facts. What 
''reasonable man" 'vould think it necessary to in-
spect meticulously every one of a thousand cheap 
wrappers before putting them on sale 1 In 1940 
the same Court follo,ved this decision in Santise 
v. l\Iartins, Inc., 2d Dept. 1940, 17 NYS 2c1 7 41, 
258 App. Div. 663, and held that a plaintiff, 'vho 
was injured by a nail protruding from the inner 
sole of a shoe he was trying on in a. department 
store, could recover from that store. This deci-
sion also seems indefensible. vVha t ''reasonable 
man'' operating a shoe store 'vould consider the 
sales of shoes unreasonably dangerous 'vithout 
carefully palpating the inside of every shoe before 
selling it 1 It is doubtful that even a manufacturer 
of garments is required to make a minute inspec-
tion ''for the purpose of discovering 'vhether a 
basting needle has not been left in a. seam.'' Re-
statement, Torts, ~ 395, Comment a .... 
The Reporter believes the majority rule ~s 
sound and is desirable. Once a duty of inspection 
is recognized to exist, it is most difficult as a prac-
tical matter to determine 'vhat must be done to 
fulfill it. What does "observable defect" mean? 
Observable from 'vhat angle and under what con-
ditions~ Is the defect any less discoverable, if, 
though not "observable,'' it can be found by· tast-
ing, smelling, hearing or feeling the chattel~ Must 
a handy hammer be used to tap the chattel; or a 
handy piece of litmus paper used to test it~ And 
if so, where do we end, other than in a modern 
testing laboratory to which eYery country store 
and retail shop must go f 
Therefore, it clearly appears, that even if Stearns-Rog-
er's role 'vas that of a "Supplier of Chattels'' there ",.as 
no obligation for him to test the fans in question. 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED 
THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF TEXAS-ZINC 
OF PRIOR EXPLOSIONS AND THE HAZ-
ARDOUS NATURE OF THE FAN WAS THE 
INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The deposition of Robert Le,vis Maurice, Jr., the 
Chief Chemist of Texas-Zinc, clearly shows that Texas-
Zinc., the Plaintiff's employer, had prior knowledg·e of 
the propensity of the fans to explode. }fr. l\{aurice tes-
tified as follows (Depo. of Robert Le,vis Maurice, pp. 
8 and. 9): 
· ·, A. Yes, sir. It seems to me that this thing 
came up and actually the person at Lucius Pitkin 
who was originally hurt up there that I hea.rd 
about was Warren Bush, Chief Chemist, whom I. 
know quite well, and I either called him or talked 
to someone who was down here at the time and it 
seems to me that the drive side of the fan wa.s 
mentioned, that this. explosion occurred in the 
packing. Now I knew that the packing on the in-
takeside of the fan, which was to be worked on, 
.. was composed of nothing more than asbestos and 
that there was no danger there at all. 
Appellant has cited authority that the knowledge 
of the contract owner is not the intervening cause. It is 
Appellee's position that this question is settled in Utah 
by the Berg v. Otis Elevator case, supra., and the ~9utfon 
v. Otis Elevator case, supra. In Berg v. Otis Elevator 
Company, the Court states that the plaintiff must prove, 
as a necessary element, in order to hold the contractor 
liable, that the contract o'vner had no kno,vledge of the 
17 
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defect. The case states, at page 835 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
4. The decided \veight of authority supports 
the proposition that "~hen an independent ,con-
tractor has done work on an instrumentality nnd 
by his "\vork makes the instrumentality imminently 
dangerous to those he kne""'" \vould use it, he re-
mains liable, even after the completion of his \vork 
and its aceeptance by the contractee, to third par-
ties injured as the result of his negligence if the 
contractor kne\v or in viewr of the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the case should have kno,vn the dan-
gerous condition by him created, and the C01l-
tractee had no knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion or defect which was so concealed that reason-
able insp·ection by the contractee would not ha.ve 
discovered it ... (Emphasis supplied) 
Justice Thurman, in Sutton v. Otis Elevator Com-
parn.y, again articulated this principle, and states on page 
448 of the Pacific Reporter: 
(11) But it is contended that, in any event, 
knowledge of the contractee of the danger created 
by the contractor is matter of defense only; that it 
is not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove "rant of 
knowledge as an element of liability. I am of 
opinion that it is an element of liability, under the 
Gertrude Berg decision, and cases therein cited. 
It is also suggested that to require plaintiff, 
in a case of this kind, to make proof of a. contrar-
tee's \Vant of kno,vledge might he inconvenient 
and in many cases bar recovery. It is not an 
unusual thing for litigants in court to fail for 
"Ta.nt of proof. However, no one should desire the 
establishment of a rule that "rould seriously ham-
per either a plaintiff or a defendant in obtaining 
evidenee to establish his cause of action or de-
18 
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fense. It seems, ho,vever, that the solicitude man-
ifested for fear a plaintiff in this kind of case may 
not be able to obtain proof of the eontractee's 
'vant of knowledge is without substantial founda-
tion. In the very nature of the case the plaintiff 
will usually have the sympathy, good will, and 
assistance of the contractee, as in the ease at bar, 
for the reason that the eontractee, who is usually 
liable in any event, 'viii be vitally interested in es-
tablishing the contractor's liability, hoping there-
by to establish a cause of action in his own favor 
against his contractor, whose negligence may have 
caused the injury. 
This view is also supported by Dean Prosser (Pros-
ser on Torts 2nd Edition, Section 85, page 519). 
One important limitation recognized in several 
cases is that the contractor is not liable if he has 
merely carried out carefully the plans, specifica-
tions, and directions given him since in that case 
the responsibility is assumed by the employer, at 
least where the plans are not so obviously danger-
ous that no reasonable man 'vould follow them. 
In the only cases that have been found on the 
point, it has been held that the employer's failure 
to discover the defect will not relieve the con-
tractor of liability; but that if he discot·ers the 
darnger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility 
supersedes that of the contractor." (Emphasi~ 
supplied) 
In accord: Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 
196 N.W. 171; Price v. Johnston Cotton Con~pany of 
Windell, 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E. 2d 344; H owa.rd v. Rein.-
hart and Donovarn Co., 196 Okl. 506, 166 P. 2d 110. 
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POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN R.E-
FUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE 
JURY ON THE THEORY OF A BREACH OF 
WARRANTY. 
The warranty theory produced by plaintiff has no 
substance. The cases cited by him refer to a different 
factual situation, than the case at hand. There was no 
sale of fans from Stearns-Roger to Texas-Zinc, and 
Stearns-Roger can not be considered a ''Supplier of 
Chattels.' ' 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING PLAINTIFF'S EX. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
The accident in question occurred on or about the 
12th day of September, 1960. The exhibits in question 
are all dated during the year 1962. They have no ma-
teriality in this case. For the purpose of Summary 
Judgment, it "~as admitted that there "~as a chemical mix-
ture in the sealing compound that caused the accident in 
controversy. The issue in this case, ho"rever, is ho'v 
Stearns-Roger, or anyone else, could have knowledge of 
that fact. The Appellant tendered these exhibits to 
show knowledge of Stearns-Roger of the propensity of 
the fans to explode. Obviously, kno"~ledge of the in-
dustry two (2) years st1bsequent to the aeciclent, and 
six (6) years after installation is totally immaterial. 
20 
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POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellee does not disagrHe with the authorities cited 
by Appellant as to the requirement that a Motion for 
Summary Judgment should not be granted if there is a 
genuine issue a.s to a material fact. There is no issue. 
The admitted facts are: 
1. The selection of the fans was made by Texas-Zinc. 
2. The fans came fully assembled. 
3. The alleged cause of the accident was the sealing 
compound in the fans. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action as to 
the Defendant, and Plaintiff's remedy, if any, lies 
against the Duriron Company. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ELTON AND l\fOORE 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defen.da;nt-
Resp,on.dent, Stearns-Roger 
JJfanufa:ctur·ing ComrJa.ny 
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